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Concessions at South Works: 
What Price a Rail Mill? 
By David Bensman 
Rutgers University 
Things are grim in South Chicago. 
Two years ago, Wisconsin Steel went 
bankrupt, leaving 4,000 steelworkers 
without jobs, pension plans, and their 
last paycheck. Then Pullman Standard 
closed, after United Steelworkers of 
America District Director Jack Parton's 
frantic efforts to save the plant failed. 
U.S. Steel's South Works itself is down 
to a crew of 950, one-seventh its size of 
two years ago. And the Republic Steel 
mill, scene of the Memorial Day 
Massacre of 1937, is down from 5,300 to 
less than 3,000 employees. 
As the mills slump, many of the little 
"bucket shops" that service the mills 
have closed. The loading docks on the 
banks of the Calumet River are quiet as 
a graveyard. 
You can see the pain of America's 
industrial contraction on the streets. 
Torrence Avenue, alongside the rusting 
hulk that was Wisconsin Steel, is full of 
boarded-up groceries and saloons. And 
in Irondale, wooden frame houses that 
withstood a hundred Chicago winters 
and the Great Depression are 
crumbling. 
In Spring 1982, U.S. Steel delivered 
an ultimatum: South Works would not 
get a new rail mill that would employ 
450 workers and make it possible to 
keep 3,000 hands working—unless 
Local 65 agreed to a change of work 
rules. 
Just in case the devastation of South 
Chicago was not sufficient to force Local 
65's acceptance, U.S. Steel heaped on 
other pressures. The company halted 
repair work at the big No. 8 blast 
furnace and announced plans to give 
greater importance to the Gary Works at 
the expense of South Works. Next, it 
shut down its mill in Alabama, where a 
new tube mill had been planned. 
Finally, boats began picking up ore in 
South Chicago for delivery to Gary. The 
message seemed clear: South Works 
was in jeopardy. 
Local 65, it seemed, had to make 
concessions. With unemployment 
rampant, where else could members 
find work? Even if they followed 
Reagan's advice to leave for Houston, 
how could they sell their homes? 
Roy Hollis, a crane operator 
unemployed for 14 months, expressed 
the steelworkers' desperation: "How 
can we say we ain't going to accept it 
when we don't have anything? They're 
in the driver's seat, so you just have to 
ride." Roy Hollis's resignation, though 
understandable was not typical. 
Instead, Local 65 members united in 
rejection of U.S. Steel's demands. 
Although many demands were 
painful, the hardest to swallow would 
have abolished craft lines. One would 
have created "supercrafts," combining 
the tasks of millwrights, electricians, 
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and welders. The other would have 
destroyed the traditional prohibition 
against skilled workers doing 
production. These proposals were 
aimed at a problem about which the 
company has long complained: 
maintenance workers don't work 
continuously. They fix a machine, then 
rest until needed. By combining three 
crafts and merging production and 
maintenance jobs, the company hoped 
to eliminate "nonproductive" time. 
Monte Meauhead, a millwright, 
believes this is unjust: "We have to 
work through lunch, through our 
breaks, and a lot of times it's voluntary, 
because we want to see the mill run too. 
But I don't believe that you have to be a 
slave to your job." 
Local 65 could not accept the 
destruction of craft traditions. Bitter 
conflicts that had divided the union for 
a decade were laid aside on July 16, 
when the officers agreed to face down 
the company's ultimatum. Even 
recently elected President Donald 
Stazak, a self-described "company 
man" went along. 
Had the union accepted company 
demands, workers at the rail mill would 
have had to work harder, in less safe 
conditions, for lower rates of pay. But 
their decision to defy U.S. Steel was 
more than a refusal to make material 
sacrifices. Their fundamental 
motivation was anger at their bosses, 
and a sense of honor. 
Anger at the boss is rooted in the 
experience of working in the mill. 
Steelworkers put up with an authority 
that pervades their life on the job and at 
home. They work rotating shifts, first 7 
a.m. to 3 p.m., then 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., 
then 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. Assignments are 
made from week to week, leaving 
workers and their families unable to 
plan their lives more than a week in 
advance. And management still orders 
people to work with mandatory over-
time with just an hour's notice—even 
when thousands are on lay-off. The 
authoritarian environment breeds 
conflict over foremen's favoritism, 
disputed piece rates, excessive 
absenteeism, and so on. This conflict is 
part of the mill, a familiar, chronic, 
controlled tension. But when U.S. Steel 
purchased Marathon Oil, then 
threatened to shut down South Works, 
tension turned to anger. 
In Roy Hollis's words, "A big 
company like that, they just take the 
money and do what they want." And in 
Monte Meauhead, U.S. Steel's betrayal 
has produced a radical response: "How 
come the company can't be fair to the 
workers after all the years we put in and 
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built that company up? And now they 
want to get into oil " 
Steelworkers have also developed a 
pride in resisting management that 
enables them to survive an 
authori tar ian environment . Job 
classifications, craft identities, and work 
rules all mark the limits of the bosses' 
power. Steve Alexander, a black 
production workers, explains: "No one 
wants to back down against the 
company. It's that macho toughness of 
workers who have a fairly strong union: 
you don't give in To black workers, 
it's more. It's this feeling that it's like 
working in a plantation atmosphere." 
The deepest source of resistance is the 
workers' sense of obligation to uphold 
the union. The union rests upon 
principles to which members adhere 
regardless of their individual interest. 
For example, steelworkers insist that 
the company pay the lowest rated 
workers not much less than the highest 
rated. And they maintain a seniority 
system that subordinates the interest of 
the strongest worker to the needs of the 
group. 
Spencer Redd, who's been out of 
work for a year, explained the seniority 
principle: "I think an older man should 
be able to work. I just have to sacrifice. 
It might hurt me now, but eventually it 
will benefit me." 
U.S. Steel's demands threatened 
union principles. The company's most 
radical proposals—the creation of 
"operating technicians" to do both 
production and maintenance work, for 
example—would have directly affected 
only a few dozen men in the rail mill. 
But Local 65 members felt it would be 
dishonorable to jeopardize the interests 
of thousands of their contemporaries 
and descendants to get a few hundred 
jobs in South Chicago. 
flee Mezo, one of the local's ten 
elected grievers, explained: "The guy 
who's been around any length of time 
doesn't want to go against tradition. He 
cares about the next generation." 
When I asked Steve Alexander why 
steelworkers were concerned with 
principles in the face of ecnomic 
calamity, he answered that "even the 
conservative people like to think of 
themselves as good trade unionists." 
But the story at South works was not 
to end here, for neither Donald Stazak 
nor United Steelworkers President 
Lloyd McBride was willing to risk losing 
the rail mill. After national concession 
bargaining broke down on July 30, Local 
65 President Stazak asked McBride to 
send his assistant, Sam Camens, to 
South Chicago. 
As soon as Camens entered the 
picture, U.S. Steel changed its tune. 
The company dropped many demands, 
including the proposal to create "super-
craftsmen." But the company insisted 
on four points. (1) "Operating techni-
cians" were essential. (2) The union 
would have to waive its right to grieve 
"The union rests upon principles 
to which members adhere regardless 
of their individual interests 
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the job classifications spelled out in the 
manning agreement. (3) The company 
would consider "ability" as well as 
seniority in filling production jobs in the 
rail mill. (Since production workers 
would help out with repairs, this provi-
sion could mean that management will 
select mostly skilled workers for the 
new facility.) And (4), management 
insisted on eliminating welders. 
Local 65 negotiators resisted these 
proposals, but the tide turned when 
Camens—who has considerable 
prestige in the union—said the com-
pany was not bluffing. And so, even 
though Local 65's concessions could be 
used as precedents to force other plants 
to weaken their work rules and even 
though the new rail mill in South 
Chicago would displace workers at the 
other rail mills, the International gave 
Local 65 permission to bargain. 
Camens's approval gave President 
Stazak what he wanted, support for 
reaching agreement with U.S. Steel. 
Local 65 bargainers dropped their 
resistance to a manning agreement for 
the rail mill. In return, management 
agreed to strengthen seniority rights. 
On August 27, 1,100 steelworkers 
packed the union hall to discuss the 
manning proposal. Stazak and Mike 
Ally, the grievance committee chair, 
read the proposal and asked for 
questions. When Stazak surrendered 
the floor to Joe Kransdorf, a leading 
plant militant, he set the stage for a wild 
evening. Kransdorf charged that it 
would be unsafe to have workers bent 
on meeting their production quotas 
doing maintenance work as well; they'd 
be under pressure to patch things up 
hurriedly. Furthermore, the new job 
classifications would produce a speed-
li  up so bad some workers couldn't keep 
 up. Kransdorf sat down to an ovation, 
s Alice Peruala, Local 65's militant presi-
d  dent until Stazak defeated her last fall, 
rs now took the floor. Peruala's denuncia-
ivi- tion of the manning proposal gave 
vill legitimacy to the opposition, 
t  It fell to Carl Alessi, from the USWA 
t District office, to defend the agreement. 
Alessi argued that operating technicians 
ese would do only minor repairs. "Alessi 
le  was saying that you will only be used 
}le on small maintenance jobs," Ike Mezo 
>m- commented. "But everyone knows how 
ren the boss operates. You start with one 
be little thing, and then they've got you 
ts doing everything." If Alessi's defense 
re  of the operating technician idea failed to 
nt  impress, neither did his forecast for 
t e South Works' future. He had to agree 
a e that the company might still cancel the 
i . rail mill. And he had to admit that most 
e t members of Local 65 would remain 
f r jobless even if the mill were built. You 
sel. could see steelworkers calculating that, 
leir with only 3,000 people in the mill, 
f r they'd still be on the street. They booed 
e t Alessi off the stage, 
j . Then it was Ed Sadlowski's turn. 
:ers Sadlowski, like the union he's been 
the associated with for almost 30 years, was 
[ike in a difficult position. As a signer of the 
air, manning agreement he couldn't very 
for well speak against it. He explained to a 
red hushed audience that the bargaining 
ing committee had been trying to preserve 
did union principles in the negotiations and 
it had won expanded seniority rights, but 
»ent he conceded that "this agreement ain't 
)tas nothing to write home about." Turning 
y'd to the key question, he argued that U.S. 
up Steel would build the mill if there was a 
job demand for rails. In other words,' 'They 
>ed- don't make investment decisions at the 
LABOR RESEARCH REVIEW 45 
in't keep 
ovation, 
int presi-
: last fall, 
lenuncia-
sal gave 
Le USWA 
;reement. 
chnicians 
. "Alessi 
' be used 
Eke Mezo 
ows how 
with one 
got you 
J defense 
i failed to 
ecast for 
to agree 
ancel the 
that most 
i remain 
>uilt. You 
ting that, 
the mill, 
ey booed 
i's turn, 
e's been 
ears, was 
ler of the 
in't very 
ined to a 
argaining 
preserve 
tions and 
ghts, but 
lent ain't 
Turning 
that U.S. 
ere was a 
Is, "They 
»ns at the 
bargaining table." 
The workers had heard enough. Con-
cessions would not guarantee them jobs 
and would worsen working conditions. 
They struck up a chant, "vote now." 
Everyone in the union hall could see 
that the agreement would be defeated 
overwhelmingly. 
To insure the pact's ratification, 
President Stazak organized a strange 
election. He announced that the vote 
would be "advisory," and the cam-
paign would be unusual. There would 
be no debate in the union newspaper, 
and only Stazak would have access to 
the mailing list. Since few people are 
working in the mill, that arena for 
campaigning was out, too. 
The mail ballot included a letter 
urging members to vote "yes." And the 
actual ballot read, "Advisory Ballot. 
Should Local 65 Rail Mill Negotiating 
Committee sign the Rail Mill Manning 
Agreement in a joint effort to re-
establish South Works as a viable 
competitive facility?" 
In desperation, the opposition turned 
to the press. They even called a press 
conference, where President Frank 
Guzzo of Local 1033 at nearby Republic 
Steel expressed concern that conces-
sions at South Works could hurt his 
local. And Steve Alexander charged the 
agreement might make it hard for 
minorities to get hired at the rail mill. 
But against President Stazak's power 
to orchestrate the election, the opposi-
tion was of no avail. 1,795 members 
approved concessions, only 305 
opposed. 
Why did Local 65 approve conces-
sions? Clearly, the South Works story 
was part of President McBride's quest to 
establish cooperative relations in the 
steel industry in the face of concerted 
corporate attacks. Joe Kransdorf com-
ments: "How could the International 
expect a local with 6,000 of its members 
on layoff to make a rational decision? 
The International should make sure that 
locals are not picked off one by one." 
Still, when all is said and done, 1,795 
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steelworkers voted to approve 
concessions. Their decision needs no 
explanation; they saw no alternative. 
But Local 65's decision might have 
been different had the vote been con-
ducted at a meeting where Kransdorf, 
Peruala, and Mezo could explain their 
opposition. Then the members' anger at 
U.S. Steel and their sense of honor 
might have prevailed, as it had at the 
August 27 meeting. 
But when members at home face the 
choice alone, cut off from the feelings of 
solidarity that prevail at a^ union 
meeting, they consider mostly their 
own interest. Those who are still work-
ing vote "yes" to keep the mill open; 
workers whose preferential status is 
abolished by the manning agreement 
vote "no ." Laid-off workers with 10 to 
20 years seniority vote "yes"; here they 
were the bulk of the voters. Low-
seniority workers, who cannot hope for 
reemployment, have been laid off so 
long they can't vote. In short, here the 
leadership of the International and of 
Local 65 combined their effort to enable 
the calctflations of self-interest to over-
whelm sentiments of solidarity. 
The decision by South Chicago 
unionists to make concessions to save 
their mill is but the opening scene of a 
long drama. More difficult choices will 
follow, because the underlying problem 
steelworkers face has not yet been 
resolved. Fundamentally, the unions' 
dilemma is that the world economy has 
changed. 
For a hundred years, the American 
steel industry produced for domestic 
consumers without worrying about 
foreign competition. The internal steel 
market grew so rapidly that employers 
and workers could share "the growth 
dividend," even if unequally. 
Things have changed. Foreign 
manufacturers have penetrated the 
domestic market. Our steel industry lost 
one major cost advantage when the 
Mesabi iron range became depleted; 
now Japanese steelmakers can buy 
Venezuelan and Brazilian ore as cheaply 
as can U.S. companies. Changes in 
transportation costs are also significant; 
today Japanese manufacturers can ship 
steel coils to South Chicago cheaper 
than American firms can transport coal 
from Pennsylvania mines to Calumet 
harbor. 
Our steel industry faces a competition 
it has not known since U.S. Steel was 
organized in 1901. The conservative 
habits of U.S. manufacturers, their 
high-price strategy, their slowness to 
introduce new technology, their short-
term profit orientation, and their 
managerial inefficiency are all no longer 
viable. 
When international competitors gained 
the ability to produce steel for sale in 
U.S. markets, American firms responded 
slowly. They upgraded their mills 
piecemeal, kept prices high, delayed 
introducing new technology. At the 
same time, they began moving capital to 
more profitable sectors. As a result, 
Japanese and other steel producers 
steadily increased their share of 
domestic sales, first selling low-grade 
steel, then switching to high-grade 
alloys that were the big money-makers. 
Today imports account for more than 30 
percent of the value of all steel sold in 
this country. 
The steel industry's internationaliza-
tion poses a challenge to the union. For 
the past 40 years , American 
steelworkers have gained decent living 
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standards by sharing in the profits of 
employers sheltered from foreign com-
petitors. That shelter is gone. The chill 
winds of international trade have 
penetrated union halls in Pittsburgh 
and South Chicago. 
To gain perspective on what this 
means, let us look back a hundred 
years; when trade unionists faced 
another wrenching change. After the 
Civil War, American industry outgrew 
local boundaries, as the railroads 
stretched across the continent. At the 
same time, iron manufacturers 
developed the Bessemer process and 
other improvements. Suddenly, iron 
workers were caught up in a 
competitive flood that washed away old 
institutions and work practices. 
Cooperage, one of America's leading 
industries in 1860, producing barrels for 
shipping food, beer, liquor, and 
manufactured goods, was transformed 
in less than two decades. The proud 
cooper, who had controlled his skill as 
his union controlled the workplace, 
passed into oblivion. 
But the transformation of most 
industries proceeded gradually. 
Workers used their skill and concerted 
power as levers to gain a voice in deter-
mining how employers would organize 
the new factories. Workers could not 
shape the industrial world solely on the 
basis of their local unions and work 
rules. To gain leverage, skilled workers 
had to establish national unions strong 
enough to ensure that the various locals 
followed the same policy; and national 
officers struggled to gain the power to 
prohibit locals from striking in hopeless 
situations. 
During that struggle, unionists 
debated concessions with an intensity 
Local 65 members would find familiar. 
Members of the Hat Finishers' National 
Association, for example, debated for 
five years whether to give up the right to 
strike for wage advances, whether to 
give up the right to call shop meetings 
whenever grievances arose, and 
whether to shorten the apprenticeship 
term. Reluctantly, hatters made these 
concessions to management, but the 
institutions they created in the process 
proved successful in defending the 
journeymen's "culture of work" for 
many years. 
After all the concessions hatters made 
in the 1880s, their national union's 
"label boycotts" succeeded in organ-
izing more workers after 1895 than had 
ever been organized before. And they 
united with allied craftspeople in 1896 
to form a larger, more powerful 
organization. As the reinforced union 
pursued its label boycotts with the help 
of other AFL unions, hatters drew ever 
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closer to workers in other crafts, until 
their "craft pride" began to give way to 
"class consciousness." The hatters' 
path, of course, was just one of those 
taken by unionists in the late 19th 
century, but all activists discovered that 
the growth of national markets 
necessitated more collective strategies 
for labor. The internationalization of 
markets will transform the contem-
porary labor movement just as 
profoundly. 
Recent concession bargaining in 
South Chicago makes clear that the 
United Steelworkers of America 
possesses a valuable resource—a 
membership dedicated to unionism. 
Workers' anger at their bosses and 
commitment to unionism enabled them 
to resist in the face of severe 
unemploymen t and corporate 
blackmail. Yet militancy is not enough. 
It will take leadership to forge a new 
relationship between steelworkers and 
their employers. Here the USWA seems 
weak. In negotiations between eight 
companies and the union last summer, 
President McBride never took a position 
on whether steelworkers should reopen 
their contract; instead, he conveyed the 
employers' request to begin discus-
sions. When the companies asked to 
run slide shows describing American 
industry's problems in international 
marketplaces, McBride agreed; but 
steelworkers never saw an analysis by 
their own union. And McBride made no 
effort to involve the union's secondary 
leaders in the bargaining. No wonder 
steelworkers grew so suspicous that 
anti-concession sentiments over-
whelmed the bargaining process. 
Compare the Steelworkers' approach 
to that taken by the United Automobile 
Workers. In the auto industry, conces-
sion bargaining was a relatively open 
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process in which President Fraser 
played the role of passionate advocate, 
while thousands of union activists 
participated in shaping events. In the 
course of bargaining, the UAW 
developed a political dialogue that 
informed members about the issues, 
enabling them to make a decision 
they're willing to back up. By contrast, 
steelworkers are uninformed about 
what's happening to them and divided 
amongst themselves. 
The UAW has another advantage. It 
has a program for stabilizing employ-
ment. Recognizing that hundreds of 
thousands of jobs will be eliminated in 
auto plants no matter what scenario is 
played out, the UAW established a joint 
training program with Ford. To deal 
with foreign labor-cost advantages, the 
union proposed legislation requiring all 
auto companies selling cars in this 
country to buy or produce most of the 
parts here. The UAW has also taken 
steps to gain "job security" for 
members through experimental 
"lifetime employment" projects at two 
Ford plants and through limited bans 
on plant closings at General Motors. But 
the limits of the UAW's program have 
become painfully evident, as Chrysler 
places newspaper ads boosting its cars' 
"Japanese craftsmanship" and General 
Motors turns to Japanese manufacturers 
to produce subcompacts for GM to sell. 
If workers are to benefit from conces-
sion bargaining, they must gain some 
control over decisions about capital 
investment and new technology. 
Cooperative labor relations will not help 
unionists if corporations install robots 
and computers without input from their 
employees, or if tlrey flee American 
taxes and labor laws for low-wage 
havens abroad. 
Can American workers gain a handle 
on decisions that have for so long been 
in the corporations' domain? Certainly, 
workers in South Chicago alone cannot 
do it; even their international union will 
have little success in the absence of a 
national political movement committed 
to social controls on corporate decision-
making. 
Nor is it only industrial workers that 
are suffering from the international 
economic upheaval. Manufacturers 
need cooperative relations if they're to 
become competitive. The corporations' 
needs give unions leverage. They can 
threaten to strike; they can also offer to 
help boost production. As long as 
steelworkers remain committed to 
unionism, concession bargaining can be 
transformed into a straggle for the 
future of the labor movement. 
Postscript 
Christmas did not bring good tidings 
to South Chicago. U.S. Steel's 
Christmas present to its employees at 
South Works was an announcement 
that the rail mill would not be built until 
1985. 
Many steelworkers in the Calumet 
region speculate that the mill will never 
be built, that South Works itself is 
finished. Mike Ally, Local 65's 
grievance committee chairman, has 
been most vocal. "If they don't make 
some kind of decision, and quit stalling 
and all the rest of the bunk they've been 
giving us on the rail mill, we will come 
out swinging. There are a lot of options. 
That's definite," Ally said. 
(This article is reprinted from Dissent, 
Winter 1983.) 
